Trade rules and global governance: A long term agenda. The Future of Banking by Deutsch-Französisches Wirtschaftspolitisches Forum (Ed.)
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Deutsch-Französisches Wirtschaftspolitisches Forum (ed.)
Working Paper
Trade rules and global governance:
A long term agenda. The Future of
Banking
ZEI working paper, No. B 05-2001
Provided in cooperation with:
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Suggested citation:  (2001) : Trade rules and global governance: A long term agenda. The













Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung




Trade Rules and Global
Governance: A Long Term





Forum Economique Franco-Allemand /Deutsch-Französisches
Wirtschaftspolitisches Forum  1
Trade Rules and Global Governance: A long term Agenda  4
The Future of Banking 212
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Deutsch-Französisches Wirtschaftspolitisches Forum
Together with other members of the European Union, France and Germany embarked on an
unprecedented cooperative venture. To be successful, Economic and Monetary Union
requires a very high degree of mutual understanding among the policymakers of the
participating countries. It also requires upgrading the dialogue between those who contribute
to shaping the policy debates on both sides of the Rhine.
France and Germany have a long tradition of high-level dialogue and cooperation in the
framework of bilateral and European institutions. But the dialogue between their civil
societies does not match this spirit of cooperation. Economists and those involved in
practical economic policy making from both countries in particular rarely talk to each other to
find out why they may have differing visions of the functioning of Economic and Monetary
Union and of the associated challenges, and even more rarely try to narrow the divergence
of their views. This lack of dialogue contributes to keeping alive entrenched prejudices on
the other country's supposedly hidden policy agenda.
Yet, an Economic and Monetary Union in which policy debates with a bearing on European
policy choices remain confined within national boundaries would be prone to instability,
because disagreements about policies would tend to end up in dispute between countries. It
is, therefore, of utmost importance to foster the emergence of a genuine European
professional discussion on major economic policy issues.
The purpose of the Deutsch-Französisches Wirtschaftspolitische Forum/Forum économique
franco-allemand is to contribute to this discussion through the organisation of a series of
informal meetings between French and German economists.
The Forum assembles professional economists from academia, business and the public
sector. As a non-partisan institution, the Forum brings together participants from all strands
of thinking about economic policy with the aim of stimulating fruitful debate. Each meeting is
devoted to one or two major policy issues. The Forum commissions papers to provide an
informed basis for the discussion, but the focus will be on debate and the exchange of
views, starting with reactions from discussants whose role will be to present alternative
views and to frame the key issues for the debate.3
The proceedings of each meeting are published in policy paper format. With the present
brochure, we present papers of the discussion from the Forum's seventh meeting on July 3 -
4, 2000 in Paris. We hope that this will be a useful input into an emerging public debate on
Europe's economic policies in our two countries and beyond.
Jürgen von Hagen
Jean Pisani-Ferry4
Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda
1
Pierre Jacquet (
*), Jean Pisani-Ferry (
**) and Dominique Strauss-Kahn (
***)
In 1999-2000, global governance issues have received widespread attention and have
recurrently come to the fore of international news reports. But, save for welcome exceptions,
this was not because attempts at organising collective action were producing results.
Instead, the two features that came out most strongly were the failure or disappointing
results of some highly visible meetings, such as the WTO ministerial in Seattle in December,
1999, or the Environmental Conference in The Hague in November, 2000, and the emerging
tradition of vivid demonstrations that have accompanied high level international meetings,
often brilliantly orchestrated by newly famous NGOs. To be sure, this combination of
discontent and failure dates back some way to earlier unhappy initiatives, such as the failed
MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment) project negotiated at the OECD. But Seattle
gave it a new potency.
Many have been tempted to attribute the failure of Seattle to the demonstrators in the street.
In fact, they may well have got the causality wrong. Seattle exposed a profound lack of
shared vision and agreement on objectives among participating governments, unable to
bridge their differences in due time and in the context of poor preparatory work. Ex post,
therefore, it is apparent that Seattle was bound to fail, even if NGOs had not been present
outside the meeting rooms. And, in fact, the failure of Seattle contributed to the success and
media coverage of the NGOs. It exposed disagreements between major players on how to
proceed, has now made life even more complex for negotiators by introducing a new set of
actors from the “civil society”, and does leave the whole system without a sense of direction,
even if past commitments guarantee that negotiations will still be going on in Geneva for the
foreseeable future.
Some observers, scholars and opinion leaders are bound in denial : anti-globalisers, they
argue, have it all wrong, do not understand what globalisation and multilateral institutions
are about or yet are moved by unrelenting ideology. “Basically ignore, condescend to
explain, and go back to work” could be their motto.
Our purpose in this paper is to argue that there is much more in the current anti-
globalisation crusade than the sheer amplification of anti-capitalist ideologies through media
coverage and the Internet. We interpret the recent, incipient backlash against globalisation
as a symptom of policy failure, as policy makers not only have provided partial responses at
best to legitimate concerns linked to globalisation, but also have failed to grasp the
challenges of collective action at the multilateral level. We argue that the time is now ripe to
seriously address central issues related to global governance well beyond the remit of the
WTO and that failure to do so could result in the progressive demise of the multilateral
system that has been so effective in underpinning economic prosperity in the second half of
the 20
th century. But recent experience suggests that there is a two-fold challenge : how to
enlist the civil society in the discussion (1
st challenge)? what guiding principles should
underpin global governance efforts (2
nd challenge)?
In a first section, we revisit the context of multilateral trade negotiations, because
international trade has been at the core of multilateral co-operation, and because the WTO
has been a constant target of anti-globalisation NGOs. We then move on to discuss, in a
second section, various strategic options to restore the momentum of collective action in the
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trade area. A third section tentatively highlights some of the constitutive elements of a long
term global governance agenda from the vantage point of the link between trade and other
governance issues. Section 4 returns to more immediate concerns and briefly outline how to
build a bridge between long term visions and short term issues.
1. TRADE RULES AND THE  WTO: WHAT IS AT STAKE ?
If anything, the Seattle fiasco has shown that the degree of misunderstanding
2 of the WTO
and of multilateral trade negotiations, by the public opinion and by the NGOs claiming to
represent civil society, is absolutely staggering. With its 500 person staff and its SwF 128
million budget, the WTO is a very small multilateral organisation by any standard. It
nonetheless came to be depicted as an excessively powerful institution pursuing its own
agenda and trying to govern the world in an undemocratic way. Its fully intergovernmental
nature, where decision emerges from consensus among its 138 members, has been
consistently ignored. It is tempting to argue that protesters had it all wrong. They pointed to
excessive and overwhelming government from the WTO while the central problem is
insufficient governance by the international community at large. The difficulty is that once
such misperception has started to pervade many sectors of the public opinion everywhere, it
is very difficult to redress.
Beyond a patent misunderstanding of the organisation, there is also a deep
misunderstanding of the process itself. The purpose of establishing rules of the game in the
field of trade in goods and services is not appreciated, while the image that surfaces is that
of a trade system dominated by the powerful and by multinationals. There is a confusion
between ex ante negotiating pressures and lobbying, which indeed is a game of power and
pressures, and the ex post result, which is precisely to contain the power of actors through
enforcing multilaterally agreed rules.
This is where the WTO has real teeth. One of the most significant innovations of the
Uruguay Round was the considerable strengthening of the dispute settlement mechanism.
Dispute settlement, based on the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the Appellate Body is
one of the very strong features of the organisation, and has already been extensively used
in its first five years. It is a very powerful mechanism, because it subjects all member
countries to a quasi-judicial order that can legitimate a resort to trade sanctions if countries
do not live up to their commitments. But the DSB does not decide on the extent of
liberalisation.
This misrepresentation is also a challenge to communication. And the task of proper
communication does not only fall on the WTO shoulder. Governments have generally fared
poorly in trying to explain the WTO: either they minimise its role and become vulnerable to
the charge that it leaves the interests of the more powerful among states and firms rule
unchecked; or they emphasise the power of the Dispute Settlement Body and feed the
criticism that the WTO is all powerful. Member countries, most notably the Quad countries,
are also largely responsible because their broad attitudes to the WTO, their negotiating
postures, and their domestic debates, often characterised by strong misgivings about
globalisation, do not adequately reflect the nature and purpose of the multilateral negotiating
exercise. The reality is that the WTO is two different things at the same time, as we develop
below: a secretariat in charge of multilateral trade rules, and an institution that has already
made some inroad toward the governance of globalisation, albeit limited in scope, whose
functioning requires focus and attention.
In refining the argument, it is useful to assess the relevance of the current framework of
trade rules administered by the WTO against the three important criteria of efficiency, equity
and legitimacy
3. In these three important respects, the current system has over time faired
fairly well, but increasingly exhibits serious flaws that need to be attended.
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Efficiency
The GATT/WTO framework has produced two major achievements: trade liberalisation, and
an effective rules-based multilateral trade system whose credibility is enhanced by a unique
dispute settlement mechanism. Both contribute to economic efficiency: trade liberalisation
through the benefits from trade; and the rules-based system through the settlement of
conflicts as a way to prevent escalation of trade wars and to limit unilateralism and non co-
operative behaviour, such as free riding. Credible rules of the game also enhance the
predictability of market access, thus lowering investment uncertainty and bolstering
economic growth and prosperity.
Postwar economic growth, as well as the current economic expansion in the United States
and in Europe, are testimonies to the benefits from trade. The classical view, based on
comparative advantage, focuses on the efficient resource allocation allowed by
specialisation in a perfect competition, fixed technology framework. Consumers also benefit
from greater choice and cheaper goods and services. Even more important, there are also
dynamic efficiency gains from competition, through innovation, best practice benchmarking,
technology transfers and other channels. As the degree of actual globalisation is actually
much smaller than the ongoing debate suggests and our countries, however open, remain
largely centred on themselves, gains from further trade liberalisation are probably quite
large
4.
More recent trade theory, however, highlights some of the shortfalls in the classical theory:
as imperfect competition, asymmetric information, increasing returns to scale, and technical
change, rather than static technology and perfect competition, are the normal state of
affairs, there are gains from trade through larger markets and economies of scale, but there
is also room for efficiency-enhancing, market supporting government intervention. For
example, markets can work even when information and competition are imperfect, but we all
know that more often than not, they don’t work well and some kind of regulatory support is
called for.
But this gives no support whatsoever for unilateral protective measures : not only is
protection seldom appropriate to deal with market failures, but it is also politically vulnerable
to capture by parochial interest groups, and it is furthermore likely to invite costly retaliation
from trade partners. This highlights some of the central benefits to be expected from a
multilateral, rules-based system geared toward liberalisation : it legitimates the use of
government measures and codifies codes of conduct – all of which is a far cry from “free
trade” – while submitting them, through liberalisation efforts, to the test of efficiency and to
the constant need to adapt to economic and technical change. Liberalisation should be
thought of  not as a quest for free trade, but as a “Schumpeterian” process of creative
destruction of obsolete regulations that need to be replaced by more appropriate and
efficient ones. Moreover, the multilateral arena is the right place to discuss the proper mix –
and the subsidiarity - of market and government regulations, that is needed to make the
market system more effective.
This suggests that the WTO and multilateral trade negotiations should no longer be posited
as an elusive and rather misleading quest for “free trade”. The true quest is for efficient trade
and markets, and that requires hard thinking on the kind of regulatory framework and
government policies, both at the national level and internationally, that are likely to promote
market efficiency. It is a question of policy design, rather than policy irrelevance. The
liberalisation drive helps to evince costly protectionist policies, but the task of policy
construction remains largely unchartered. It is important that the nature of the exercise be
properly recognised. This dimension can only grow with the development of the “new
economy”; whose features more than often challenge the standard assumptions of
competitive markets.
There is another, important dimension to efficiency. It refers to the maximisation of the value
produced from a given resource input. One usually tends to measure value from statistics
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about GDPs and growth rates. But, of course, value is a much broader concept, and the
welfare function of an individual or a society is not restricted to the level of income or the
rate of growth. Access to public services, for example as regards education, cultural
diversity, income distribution, the sense of security, including food safety, and the quality of
the environment are also intrinsic parts of welfare. Moreover, there are important and
legitimate differences in the way various societies think of their collective welfare. Collective
preferences differ between countries. For example, less developed countries may care less
about environmental damage than richer countries, and it is well known that the early stages
of industrialisation bring environmental damage. Or different societies might have different
attitudes towards risk: a case in point is the difference in attitudes of the US and Europe vis-
à-vis GMOs, which is not rooted in attitudes toward trade but rather in the societies’
collective memories and in their conception of the role of the State.
It would indeed be unreasonable to think of international trade rules as instruments to
promote these other values; but, certainly, trade has impacts, positive and negative, that
ought to be taken into account. Here again, a dogmatic approach to “free trade” is not an
appropriate response. Rather, what the world ought to be looking for is something like
liberalisation accompanied with “efficient protection”
5.
Equity
Not only are there gains from trade, but there are also “pains from trade”
6. And pains often
come in the short term, while gains are more likely to materialise over the longer term, which
helps explain why the widespread allegiance to the gains from trade from so many
governments does not easily translate into single-headed liberalisation. In particular, in our
societies, as theory predicts, unskilled workers have borne the brunt of the costs of
adjustment to trade and technological change
7 and that also explains why we all struggle
with an incipient backlash to globalisation. Globalisation will not be socially sustainable or
morally acceptable if part of the gains are not redirected through appropriate distributive
policies to those who suffer from job displacement or loss of income. Indeed, social policies
are a key component of governments’ pro-globalisation policies. The scope and nature of
redistribution, as well as the pace of transition, will depend on national preferences and do
not require full global harmonisation. But increased factor mobility restricts the ability of
governments to undertake tax-based redistribution. The standard answer from trade
specialists that such policies should be recognised as necessary complements to trade
liberalisation is basically correct but cannot be considered sufficient to put an end to the
issue.
Equity also comes out as a deep concern with regard to the situation of many developing
countries. It is urgent to recognise the shortfalls of convergence alongside its successes.
While a growing “middle class” of emerging countries has succeeded in escaping poverty
and catching up with industrialised nations, a widening gap has developed between the top
end and the bottom end of world income distribution. Contrary to what classical economists
would have predicted, worldwide convergence between the rich and the poor simply does
not take place spontaneously. It is increasingly clear that globalisation may also act as a
force of exclusion, and that risk is further enhanced by the emergence of the so-called
“digital divide” that introduces another innovation-based discrimination among countries
8.
This is a central challenge for world governance, calling for reform both in the way existing
multilateral institutions conceive development aid and conditionality, but also in the bilateral
aid policies of individual countries. It is also a matter for consideration by the WTO itself,
especially in the aftermath of Seattle, where one could argue that a new North-South rift has
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been in the making. It has become apparent that the desire to enlist the South in restoring
the multilateral momentum faces a number of obstacles.
First, most developing countries simply do not have the resources to be present in Geneva,
to take part in the discussions, to conduct the necessary studies crucial to a definition of
their own policies with respect to trade and opening. Hence the growing feeling that the
WTO is a closed club of rich countries that does not include new members on an equal
basis, with the United States and Europe deciding – or procrastinating - for all the rest, and
developing countries not being able to air their own objectives and concerns. A better
integration of developing countries in the process of multilateral negotiations is therefore a
priority task
9.
Second, the Uruguay Round, for the first time, fully integrated developing countries as
“normal” members tied by the whole series of WTO commitments. As they are faced with
the task of implementing these commitments, they discover the costs, and are yet unsure
about the benefits. Developing countries find it notably costly to live up to their commitments
with respect to the protection of trade related intellectual property (TRIPs agreement). They
fear that in many crucial areas, such as health, these commitments might conflict head on
with their national interests.  Needless to say, a multiplication of conflicts of interpretation
around the TRIPs agreement would significantly alter its credibility.
Third, developing countries’ access to industrial countries’ markets has become a real issue.
The credibility of our message about the benefits from openness is crucially dented by our
unwillingness to recognise them ourselves when our sensitive sectors are concerned. True,
the Uruguay Round has made some progress with respect to the opening of markets for
textiles and apparel, since it provides for a gradual dismantling of Multi-Fiber Agreement
quotas. But no such progress has taken place in agriculture
10, and rich countries have
backloaded the “gradual” dismantling of the MFA and have too easily succumbed to the
temptation of invoking anti-dumping compensation. Hence the feeling in many developing
countries that they are asked to deliver faster liberalisation while some of the provisions of
the Uruguay Round have simply not been implemented by developed countries yet.
Finally, it is important to refine the message that we send developing countries about the
benefits from openness. There have now been a wealth of empirical studies arguing that
openness is over time a key contributor to development and prosperity. Openness thus
empirically emerges as a necessary condition for take-off and sustainable growth. But there
is a leap of faith in going from that reality to the mantra of liberalisation: “open, it’s good for
you”. This motto implicitly postures openness as a sufficient condition for growth. This,
however, is not supported by facts and has in fact already met with stringent denials: the
Asian crisis, a story about mismanaged liberalization of capital inflows, amply demonstrates
the point. Openness is a key objective, but it must be managed and accompanied by
structural and institutional adjustments, that are difficult and costly to implement in the short
term and will provide benefits only over time.  In societies where market institutions,
including the financial system, work poorly, unchecked openness may actually compound
the problem. With the Uruguay Round, developing countries have increasingly lost their
exceptional treatment and become full participants in the WTO agreements. It is, however,
necessary to revive some differential treatment, not in terms of the extent of the eventual
opening effort, but in terms both of the transition period necessary to phase in such effort
and of the assistance needed to strengthen their institutions and modernise their policies
(including social policies).
More often than not, however, the purpose of negotiations is set in terms of results.
However, process, practices and principles matter more than results. Moreover, the quest
for “results” is often hostage to pressure from powerful lobbies looking for increased market
access. While this is legitimate from their parochial point of view, this may distract from the
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central purpose: to progressively develop a framework for a more prosperous, less unequal
world and a better international economic governance. The time dimension, in this respect,
is crucial. To maintain the negotiating momentum, one does need deadlines, and this is
what a round is about, as opposed to ongoing negotiations that face no time constraint (and
this is why the current built-in agenda negotiations that have started on time at the WTO will
have a hard time converging on any meaningful agreement short of the start of a new
round).
Legitimacy
Equity considerations naturally translate into legitimacy problems. There are really two
separate issues to address in order to assess whether an action is legitimate: first,
“procedural legitimacy”, dealing with the way the action has been conducted; second, the
value of the results, i.e. whether the action was effective and how.
Much of the discontent at Seattle targeted the lack of democratic accountability of the WTO,
in other words procedural legitimacy. Indeed, as already suggested, several NGOs missed
the point by not recognising the fully intergovernmental nature of the WTO process.
Nationally elected governments have delegated authority to representative officials to
negotiate at the WTO and delegation is part of the democratic process. But, of course, there
is more to democracy than elections. Transparency is a key requirement, to allow the public
to have all the relevant information before judging with their ballots. But debate is also
crucial, provided it is not captured by single, parochial groups. Governments should take
responsibility more clearly for major strategic choices as regards world trade and finance.
However, as already argued above, it is important to recognise that values may legitimately
differ between countries, and these differences need to be explicitly recognised instead of
being immediately suspect as signalling protectionist impulse. Existing agreements do
include specific allowances for such differences. The outcome, should a conflict arise, will
depend both on the modalities through which such differences feed into domestic policies
and whether such modalities respect the general principles underlying the WTO
commitments (such as non discrimination), and on the ability to build a convincing case:
aptly seasoned lawyers become a crucial asset.
But we must also find ways to associate representatives of civil societies in the preparatory
work before actual negotiations. In doing so, it is necessary to acknowledge the diversity of
representation and the transparency of the groups that are invited to take part. Involving
NGOs, however, is likely to become another point of North-South contention. For many
developing countries, NGOs have no legitimacy to enter the debate, and are in fact agents
of rich countries, representing special groups’ interests that conflict head-on with their own
interests, such as labour rights or environment protection and that eventually disguise a
protectionist motive.
To the extent that liberalisation advances efficiency, it might seem that multilateral trade
negotiations targeting further liberalisation are naturally legitimate in that they provide
valuable results. The effectiveness of an action, however, is partly a relative concept: what
do we get from a specific course of action, in comparison with the alternatives? This is
where, as some NGOs also pointed out, the WTO also faces a problem of legitimacy. The
success of the multilateral trade order building on GATT and then the WTO and the relative
power of the dispute settlement mechanism establish an implicit hierarchy of norms in which
trade issues are perceived as dominating other concerns. Clearly, one of the messages
heard in Seattle is that such hierarchy needs to be seriously questioned, as no equivalent
hierarchy exists within countries between the principles of, say, free enterprise, and, say,
workers or consumers protection. Revolt against the trade order arises in large part from this
perception that international [trade] laws are based on a set of values that differs from the
set of values underlying domestic laws.
Indeed, some of the messages sent out in Seattle were that the public at large cares for
more than simply trade. It is therefore not legitimate to respond by focusing the international
action only on trade issues. What is questioned, therefore, is the implicit or explicit hierarchy
of norms that have formed the basis of international negotiations. In the view of the10
protesters in Seattle, the focus on the WTO meant that an international trade order was
established with a clear remit and the power to enforce the rules of trade. But it also implied
that an imbalance was created between the trade order and the lack of a parallel
international order in other fields of international relations. The fact that the WTO is the only
multilateral institution where the negotiating process is sufficiently formalised and where
results can be implemented, notably through the workings of the Dispute Settlement
Procedure provides no justification. Legitimacy also requires that all the other issues be
addressed by the international community, from labour rights to environment, to crime and
money laundering, to food safety and to health protection, in a proper and effective
framework.
2. BEYOND SEATTLE: WHAT WAY FORWARD?
One of the most worrying features of the current multilateral environment has been the
patent deficit of global leadership. Post world-war II liberalisation and the gradual
emergence of a multilateral world economy owe much to US leadership. It was part of a
generous, outward oriented vision, but also reflected a perception of US economic interests,
and even more of core foreign policy concerns from the economic and political hegemon of
the Western world confronted with the need to bolster alliance prosperity as an antidote to
the Soviet model. Such leadership today proves more difficult to assume by the US alone,
and this is not due only to short-term electoral considerations. The US Administration
remains strongly committed to multilateralism, but the domestic debate increasingly reflects
the views of those who narrowly consider that the US does not need multilateralism
anymore, and that its power and success allow it to pursue its own domestic interests
through a series of bilateral or regional arrangements without submitting them to
international commitments. Moreover, despite a resounding economic prosperity, the
American public is among the most concerned about globalisation, in particular because the
dynamism of job creation has been matched by that of job destruction, putting job
displacement, rather than unemployment, at the centre of the concerns of many individuals.
This also tends to weaken any multilateral commitment.
Europe’s interests and vision are not identical. It would have more to lose than the US in a
demise of multilateralism, if only because as a grouping of countries, the concept of an
international law is at the core of its own culture. The European Union should thus capitalize
on the failure in Seattle to seize the window of opportunity thus opened and fill the gap of
leadership in multilateral trade negotiations. Europe is uniquely placed for this task,
precisely because during the run-up to Seattle, it has already taken an ambitious stance for
a broad round that would have included new issues central to market access such as direct
investment and competition policy. But it must now back up its ambitious WTO strategy with
an unambiguous signal that it has a clear vision of its strategic interests in international trade
negotiations. However, short term political costs, such as those arising from liberalising to
developing and emerging countries exports, and from reforming the common agricultural
policy, tend to overshadow longer term considerations. For Europe’s voice to be heard and
listened to, a more strategic approach and a more forthcoming attitude with respect to the
reform of farm support policies are important prerequisites.
Possible strategies
Since the failure at Seattle, there has been much debate on how to restore the momentum
of the multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva. Such debate typically amounts to examining
four scenarios:
Business as usual. Many trade specialists
11 dismiss what happened in the streets of
Seattle and any reference to a new North-South rift and they focus instead on the process of
intergovernmental cooperation. With a new US administration taking charge, the argument
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goes, talks could be resumed and a new round launched. Thanks to careful preparation,
obstacles could be overcome and the Seattle setback could pave the way for a success. We
regard this strategy as potentially risky, as it overlooks the problems emphasised above and
may invite a serious backlash, with potentially much more severe consequences that those
experienced so far.  Besides, those who support such a scenario have yet to explain why
governments who could not share a common vision all along the way to preparing Seattle
would suddenly achieve it through a “business as usual” method.
A pause. Many otherwise pro-globalisation observers have argued in the aftermath of
Seattle  that the time has come to pause and avoid any activism in multilateral trade
negotiations: why not first take on board previous Uruguay round achievements and
postpone further liberalisation? Some even go as far as to argue that governments should
slow down globalisation, so as to allow citizens around the world time to adjust to some of
its harsh realities. While these reactions have the merit of recognising both adjustment costs
and the temporal dimension of adaptation to change, they broadly speaking miss the point.
The pace of change is largely driven by technological progress and private sector initiatives,
and a ‘hands off’ approach would certainly neither slow it down nor appease controversies.
Henceforth, the choice is not between more globalisation and less globalisation, but
between a “spontaneous”, market driven, response or a constructed global order tackling
the problems of efficiency, equity and legitimacy which arise with liberalisation.
A minimalist approach. According to the so-called bicycle theory, motion is more important
than speed (provided it does not slow down below a certain threshold). In order to keep
trade negotiation alive and to restore success, the minimalist view proposes to concentrate
at least initially on a limited number of issues, mostly those included in the built-in agenda.
Good work has been accomplished by the WTO secretariat and there are a number of
issues on which useful, efficiency-enhancing agreements could be reached. That includes
among others the further liberalisation of trade in agriculture and services, and a
reassessment of the TRIPs and TRIMs agreements. Among the “minimalists”, some would
want to initiate a modest round, while others would prefer the alternative route of
incremental, subject-by-subject negotiations. But none of these would solve the problems
that came into the open in Seattle and, in the short term, the lack of support for trade
negotiations would not be reversed. Restricting the range of issues to be negotiated might
even compound lack of support, especially if these issues are to be addressed in an
incremental manner, as negotiation on each of them would increasingly appear as a political
zero sum game between “winners” and “losers”, as already developed.
The trade and approach. In contrast to the previous, conservative approaches, an
alternative would be to attempt at taking on board the issues that were at the core of the
Seattle controversy, and to push for an ambitious trade round that would result both in
significant liberalisation and in concrete steps towards linking trade topics with other issues
such as labour standards and the environment. Broadly speaking, the strategy would be for
governments in developed economies to get the consent of developing countries through
market access concessions and to appease controversies at home through addressing
some of the concerns of the anti-WTO activists. Trade commissioner Pascal Lamy has
indicated sympathy for this approach, and we agree with him that all these issues must
receive a proper, global response. But the risk we see is that the trade and approach would
be opposed from all quarters : anti-WTO militants would criticise the predominance of trade
rules, while trade specialists and developing countries would oppose blurring trade
principles with heterogeneous considerations. Furthermore, the “trade and” approach
introduces a bias in the consideration of non-trade issues such as environment or labour
standards, since it would address them only in so far as their relation with trade is
concerned. At best, this would thus offer a partial response only to the broader concerns of
our public opinions.
While we thus tend to discard the first three approaches as unfit for the challenges
discussed above, we also think that the fourth one only goes half-way towards addressing
the core issues and chooses a dangerous course for achieving this half-baked result. While12
the attempt at broadening the scope of discussions is a sensible one, it lacks organising
principles for linking trade issues with other issues. If it is to be made both intellectually
respectable and politically viable, it must be made part of a still broader approach aiming at
developing global rules and institutions for a global economy. Such a global approach
cannot rest on the WTO alone. Ways need to be found to tackle the question of global
governance. This means thinking about the architecture, namely the nature, role, number
and interaction of the multilateral institutions.
This may sound like a fuite en avant. This would indeed be the case if we had claimed that
solving the problems of global governance is a prerequisite for addressing the already
daunting trade controversies. But our claim is different. Namely, without a vision of the end-
goal – how world governance should be organised in a globalised economy –, we would
lack basic principles to think about the more immediate trade and issues. We know that
progress can only be very modest and incremental. But moves, however modest, should be
made in a clear direction
12. This is why governments should now discuss the general
principles needed to underpin gradual progress toward a global architecture of globalisation.
                                                       
12 This is true for the trade and debate, but also for a number of other discussions. For example, when IMF managing director Michel
Camdessus attempted to involve the Fund in poverty alleviation, he was to some extent following what could be called a finance and
approach. This attempt was strongly rebuffed by US academics and policymakers who criticised a “mission creep” and advocated instead a
more focussed IMF, and it was essentially ended by his successor Horst Köhler. This is an indication that concrete discussions can to a large
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First principles
The reason why the WTO naturally leads to thinking about the architecture of world
governance stems from its twofold role:
It is, first, the secretariat in charge of a particular set of international rules governing a
specific type of economic interdependence between countries, called trade, which arises
from the movement of goods and services; and
Second, it is also the closest thing to an institution in charge of globalisation, as exemplified
by its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which, in its sector, is close to having the remit of an
international economic court of justice
13.
It should thus come as no surprise that trade negotiators, for whom the WTO is only in
charge of merely one aspect of economic interdependence (trade alongside money, finance,
migration, environmental spill-overs, etc.) have difficulties finding a common language with
demonstrators for whom it is a powerful institution in charge of the whole world economy, if
not more.
Both groups have a point. Trade specialists are right to resist the temptation of overloading
negotiations with issues which have little to do with international commerce, but
environmentalists and trade unionists are right to point out that it would be hard to justify a
world in which pursuing free trade was ranked higher than preserving the welfare of future
generations, or enforcing a working person's fundamental freedoms and rights.
This contradiction is increasingly recognised and this is why some trade experts advocate
returning to the pre-WTO scheme, in which the GATT was basically the secretariat of
international trade negotiations. This would however represent a step away from the
construction of effective and legitimate international rules and institutions, and a step
backward from the useful move toward a much more effective dispute settlement
mechanism that sanctioned the transformation of the GATT into the WTO.
The key issues can be summarised in three questions:
How valid is the principle of specialisation which governs the present arrangement of
international institutions?
Absent a world government that would have both the legitimacy and the ability to embark on
political arbitration between say, trade and environmental concerns, how could cross-
sectoral disputes be settled?
How should specialised institutions be governed in order to ensure legitimacy and
transparency, and how could civil society be listened to in decision-making?
Governance and specialisation. Specialisation is a founding principle of the existing
arrangements. International governance is currently based upon an array of specialised
institutions such as the WTO, the IMF, the ILO, etc.., each of which was given authority over
a specific subset of issues by specific international treaties and has to that end developed
specific legal instruments (or, in the case of weak institutions, has not). In spite of repeated
calls for more “consistency”, for example between the WTO and the IMF as regards linkages
between trade and exchange rates, or between the WTO and the ILO as regards linkages
between trade and labour, or between the IMF and the ILO as regards the social effects of
Fund programmes, linkages remain weak and, furthermore, no political authority exists that
would be able to provide arbitration in case of conflict. This arrangement thus strikingly
contrasts with what exists within countries, where (i) specialised ministerial departments do
exist, but are controlled by or accountable to an overall political authority (which can be the
head of government or the parliament), and (ii) specialised laws do exist, but take place
within the framework of a broader legal system, and draw legitimacy from being voted by a
single parliamentary institution.
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In a democracy, the specialisation of ministerial departments is merely a technical,
efficiency-enhancing arrangement. It may increase transparency and foster accountability,
but does not impact on the government’s legitimacy, which is based upon the (opposite)
premise that voters have chosen men and women and have given them overall
responsibility over a wide number of issues. But in the international system, which has
neither a government nor a parliament, institutional specialisation is essential both to the
legitimacy of institutions which precisely draw authority from the focussed mandate they
have received from the international community, and to their accountability since their
performance can only be assessed on the basis of that focussed mandate. The
specialisation principle, therefore, is essential in the international sphere, and that
infringements to this principle should be kept minimal.
Solving cross-sectoral disputes. Absent political arbitration, there are only a few solutions
in addressing cross-sectoral disputes. One is to give prominence to an institution or,
equivalently, to a subset of principles. Unequal institutional developments push in this
direction, and it is very much the road followed de facto by the WTO when addressing
issues which are outside the pure trade remit (for example, when WTO panels have to settle
cases involving environmental dimensions). However, there is no real basis for such an
approach, because the implicit presumption in a system based upon specialisation is that no
subset of law and no institution should be given prominence lest decisions could be taken
on partial premises and challenged on legitimacy grounds.
As a crucial corollary of institutional specialisation, therefore, symmetry should prevail in the
way specific laws and institutions should be treated when a conflict arises. This means that
horizontal conflict settlement procedures should give the same weight to, say, environmental
and trade concerns, and that they should not be systematically dealt with by one specialised
institution. To the extent that cross-sectoral disputes cannot be solved through such
horizontal procedures, this also means that arbitration should be provided by a neutral
institution.
Principles for multi-agency governance. International institutions have in common that
their authority stems from international treaties that provide the legal basis for their action,
but they differ widely in their governance structure, both as regards the effectiveness of
control by their shareholders and as regards the voting rules. The IMF, for example, is
governed by a board of directors appointed by member countries, who meet several times a
week and whose votes are weighted according to a country’s population and economic
weight. But other institutions have much weaker governing structure, with infrequent
meetings and a one country-one vote rule which in practice leads to government by
consensus.
While it would be beneficial to make the weakest institutions stronger, this diversity is here
to stay. But it is desirable, as a rule, to make the institutions more accountable to their
shareholders and to let the shareholders bear more responsibility for the decisions that are
taken. This is a strong prerequisite for enhancing the legitimacy of those decisions and for
avoiding that governments free-ride on policies for which they should share responsibility.
This may seem obvious, but a basic response to those who are challenging the legitimacy of
international institutions is to tighten shareholders’ control. The case for it goes beyond the
standard principal-agent argument, as responsibility for the overall consistency of the
international system can only rest with national governments. Loose governance could only
lead institutions to develop an agenda of their own and to overlap with each-other, with
potentially disastrous consequences for legitimacy and accountability, as well as for
operational consistency.
But a lesson from recent events is that whatever the quality of the governance structure,
legitimacy cannot be based on delegated authority alone. Institutions are also increasingly
required to be transparent vis-à-vis public opinion and what has been called Global Social
Movements (GSMs), and several of them have embarked on a dialogue with specialised
NGOs. There is certainly much to gain from this process, provided no confusion arises
between an institution’s responsibility vis-à-vis and accountability to its shareholders, and
the requirements of transparency towards public opinion and dialogue with NGOs.  An15
analogy with central banks may help understanding what we mean : central banks certainly
must develop a close relationship with the financial community, which may involve efforts
towards transparency and a frequent dialogue, but they remain accountable to their
shareholders, i.e. to parliaments and / or governments.
Toward a Blueprint
The conclusions we draw from our analysis is that proposals for reforming the existing
international architecture must (i) be compatible with the specialisation principle, (ii) develop
procedures to settle cross-sectoral disputes, while avoiding to create explicit or implicit
hierarchies between different domains of international integration, (iii) foster both
accountability to the ultimate shareholders and transparency vis-à-vis public opinion and the
NGOs, without creating a confusion between those requirements.
The current institutional set-up clearly does not meet these prerequisites. Specialisation
prevails, but an implicit hierarchy exists between domains, the extent of which can be
gauged using various criteria (such as legal means, decision-making mechanisms,
enforcement ability, etc..). Cross-sectoral dispute settlement mechanisms hardly exist, and
there has been a tendency to respond to claims that institutions narrowly focus on the topics
for which are responsible (freer trade for the WTO, macro-economic financial stability for the
IMF, etc…) through internalising other concerns within the remit of each institution, which
ultimately leads to contradict the specialisation principle. Finally, the governance structure is
frequently weak, and accountability is deficient. Significant progress has been made towards
transparency, but street protests highlight that more needs to be done vis-à-vis public
opinion.
What would a structure that meets our requirements look like? Ideally, we would think of an
array of specialised institutions, each governing specific aspects of interdependence - call
them the WxOs, where x stands for trade, finance, development, nuclear safety, food safety,
labour, health, environment, tradable permits, etc... According to the specialisation principle,
each institution should have a clear and focussed mandate. Each should be in charge of
establishing and enforcing commonly agreed rules and/or codes of conduct for the sector for
which it has responsibility, and, when relevant, specialised Dispute Settlement Bodies would
provide arbitration in bilateral disputes and engage in effective surveillance of the
implementation of members’ commitments. This would be done on the basis of specific
sectoral rules.
Within this framework, each institution should respect the principles and procedures of the
other institutions and resist the temptation to blur the frontiers. Consequently, social or
environmental clauses would have no future in trade law. Equally, other bodies should resist
the temptation to call for trade restrictions as a natural means of action. In areas like labour
or the environment, there is a whole array of other available instruments, from codes of
conduct and peer pressure to public recommendations and sanctions, which should be
explored in full before trade measures are contemplated.
Any blueprint needs to address at least four crucial questions: How should cross-sectoral
issues be addressed? How would decisions be enforced? How could the NGOs be
involved? How would political guidance be provided?
Cross-sectoral disputes. This is a key issue Efficiency calls for an horizontal approach, in
which specialised institutions would find ways to settle the cases bilaterally. The core
concept should be that each institution recognises the legitimacy and the expertise of the
others in their own field. There is already a basis for such an approach since, for example
the WTO, recognises the legitimacy of recommendations by the codex alimentarius and
bases its own decisions on these recommendations. This approach could be expanded to
tackle the many cross-sectoral issues that are likely to arise, especially for measures
affecting trade. The principle should be that whenever the settlement of a trade dispute
involves non-trade issues, the WTO DSB should have to request the “informed  opinion”
from the relevant specialised institution. It would then be bound either to follow that opinion,
or to explicitly motivate its decision not to follow it. This would preserve the privilege of each16
institution to make legally based decisions in its own domain, but would create procedural
constraints that would foster transparency and time consistency, and would also respect the
desirable parallelism of standards.
Obviously, an appeal procedure would be needed, for example in the case an institution
makes a decision involving issues outside its own remit without requesting an outside
opinion, or if it decides not to follow an opinion after having requested it. Ideally, therefore,
the next step should be to consider establishing a two-level system, with level 2 consisting
of a sort of "Super-DSB" which would act as a court of appeal for unresolved cross-sectoral
disputes. What is key is that this Super-DSB would not be biased towards giving
prominence to any specific set of concerns. It would not have preference for trade laws over
environmental principles, nor vice-versa. It should thus be entrusted with the legitimacy that
the WTO is missing when dealing with issues outside the narrow realm of trade.
Enforcement. Trade is more than just one channel of interdependence. Whatever their
(limited) effectiveness, trade sanctions are often resorted to because of the virtually
universal character of international commerce. They have historically been used for political
purposes, for example against South Africa during apartheid, or more recently against Iraq,
and they can more generally be used as a retaliation against reprehensible behaviour in
sectors which have no direct relationship to trade.
There is, however, a clear distinction between relying on trade sanctions as an instrument of
international law and making trade liberalisation conditional upon the adoption of different
attitudes towards child labour or the environment. In the scheme we have outlined, the
extent of trade liberalisation would be determined by a strict framework of trade
negotiations. Trade sanctions could be used only in the case of genuine deviations from
international law, subject to the authorisation or the decision of an international organisation
in which all countries participate on an equal footing. There would thus be no room for
covert protectionism. Just like the present DSB, this Super-DSB would be entitled to
authorise proportionate retaliation by countries suffering a loss, but more importantly also to
recommend and possibly impose multilateral sanctions against a country whose behaviour
violated international law and represented a threat to the international community.
The assumption that to rely on trade sanction is the best possible ways to enforce decisions
by the international community is furthermore questionable. First, there is, as already stated,
a wide array of alternative channels of graduated pressure, that each institution could
implement before considering trade sanctions. Second, financial penalties can in some
cases be at least as effective than trade penalties, as recently demonstrated in the
international community initiative against non-cooperative offshore financial centres. The
reason why they have not been frequently used has more to do with the fact that the
effectiveness of those sanctions depends on their multilateral character and on the
availability of generally agreed procedures for decision and implementation
14 (ore the lack
thereof) than with their comparative effectiveness. There is thus a case for enlarging the
panoply of possible sanctions the international community can rely on.
NGOs. We have stressed above that the dialogue which has begun between NGOs
and international institutions was a positive development and that there was much to
gain in pursuing it further. However, it would be paradoxical to limit the involvement
of the NGOs to a series of bilateral dialogues with the specialised institutions, while
the very same NGOs are vocally criticising the international institutional architecture
for its neglect of cross-sectoral issues. The question then becomes : how to involve
the NGOs in the settlement of cross-sectoral issues.
We recommend that NGOs be allowed to express their views on the occasion of the
settlement of cross-sectoral issues
15. While the parties would in most cases be states (or
groupings of states such as the EU), there is no reason why NGOs should not be allowed to
formally present their views to sectoral or cross-sectoral arbitration bodies. And if a case a
brought to the Super-DSB, they should be able to make themselves from that body. The
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only condition we would consider, however, would be to require from candidate NGOs the
kind of transparency that they demand from governments and multilateral institutions : they
would have to comply with specified transparency requirements.
Political guidance. To be workable, the system we have outlined would require that states
are willing to abide by international law. Significant progress would thus be required.
However, the traditional structure of trade discussions does not facilitate conceptual
breakthroughs. Permanent political guidance will thus be required. The G7 would be a
natural candidate, but it only represents major industrialised countries and its legitimacy can
only decline as time passes. It should thus liase with the G20
16, a wider group that could
well serve as an operational structure for North-South discussions. A significant objection
would be that poorer countries, especially from Africa, are not represented in the G20, but
they are not the most vocal in international discussions either, and they would in any case
be represented in negotiations.
3. HOW DO WE GET FROM HERE TO THERE?
Whatever the precise design of the long-term goal, practical first steps can only be modest,
because we are obviously far from any consensus on a blueprint, and because mutual trust
cannot be created from scratch. What is required for the immediate future is a practical
agenda that would make the resumption of trade talks possible by offering a method for
taking on board the concerns of the various players. This could be achieved by focusing on
four practical conditions.
Discussion. A serious discussion is needed on how the international architecture should be
reformed, much in the same way as was done for international finance. It should be
conducted in an open way, with the participation of academic experts and representatives of
the civil society from a wide range of countries. It should also start immediately in order to
bring results by the time a new US administration takes office and prepares its agenda in
spring 2001. This discussion will no doubt develop in a number of fora, but to give a signal,
the G20 could commission a high-level study group to make proposals by summer 2001.
Significant liberalisation. Industrialised countries, and especially the European Union,
should follow up their demand for a more comprehensive approach to trade issues with
action. They should clearly stand ready to offer significant unilateral trade liberalisation in
return for acceptance by emerging and developing countries of discussions on environment
and labour issues in appropriate fora.
Parallelism. The trade and approach has failed, because of the developing countries'
distrust of industrialised countries. The alternative should be to move in parallel on different
fronts without linking the corresponding issues in the negotiations but with an overall political
endeavour to move ahead on all those fronts within a given time period. Most of the burden
of making this collective commitment credible - which is obviously key for the success of the
approach we are suggesting – would fall on the G7/G20. What we have in mind basically
amounts to start a modest “global round” rather than a new, however ambitious, trade
round.
Gradualism. The choice of first steps should aim at providing test cases for the new
approach that could convince us of its validity. As Jean Monnet did for the EC, preference
should be given to a combination of a long-term vision and modest improvements from
which general lessons can be drawn.
This brings us back to what should be done within the WTO. As we have argued, restoring
momentum in Geneva hinges on our ability to make substantive progress on other issues
that it would not be reasonable to burden the WTO with. This will not solve the current
deadlock with the millenium round, but it will facilitate the work of those who currently try to
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revive the momentum. As for the content of any new round, we believe that the EU position
is right: first, the round needs to be broad enough to provide both consistency (market
access requires that direct investment and competition policy overtime become part of the
set of multilateral rules on trade), and legitimacy (in the sense that everyone would find
areas in which benefits can be expected); second, it needs to focus on the long-term
process, rather than on short-term results. What matter is the gradual emergence of a
system of rules that covers all major dimensions of market access through trade and
movements of factors. That this requires time does not mean that we should not explicitly
set it as a goal.19
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ANNEX
Example of a multi-agency, cross-sectoral dispute settlement
To figure out how the system would work, consider the following example :
nothing would change in dealing with a pure trade dispute between country A and country B.
It would be brought to the trade DSB, which would make a decision on the basis of rules
governing trade and of these rules only; appeal would be possibility undertaken as usual;
in the case country A would ban a certain categories of products on, say, food safety
grounds, while country B would claim to be hurt as a producer of those products, the WTO
would have the responsibility of assessing whether the ban is implemented in an
discriminatory way, but it would not have the competence to assess whether country A has
a valid case for introducing the ban (unlike under current arrangements, since the SPS
agreement recognises the right of countries to take protective measures but also establishes
a number of conditions that such measures must verify). It would thus rely on the opinion of,
say, the World Food Safety Organisation, which would have to assess whether evidence on
the existence of risks or other motives may justify country A decision. Having received this
opinion, the WTO would have the possibility not to follow it, but it would then have to state
its motives explicitly (and to take responsibility for that decision vis-à-vis the international
community). Its decision could be challenged by country A, in which case the dispute would
be brought to the Super-DSB.
In practice, it is likely that a large number of disputes would be settled at the horizontal level
without having recourse to the Super-DSB, since specialised institutions would have both
expertise and legitimacy in their own field.
Alternative examples could be found outside the trade area :
assume that country A suffered direct loss through breach of environmental codes of
conduct by country B. Country A would then take country B to the environmental DSB,
which would make a ruling on the basis of environmental rules only. If country B complied
with the ruling, the process would stop there. If not, country A would be able to appeal to the
Super-DSB, which could then allow it recourse to proportionate bilateral sanctions against
country B;
assume that, in spite of repeated recommendations by the relevant world organisation,
country C's behaviour as regards nuclear safety represents a threat to the international
community at large. The nuclear safety organisation would take the matter to the Super-
DSB, which could decide to impose multilateral sanctions on country C.21
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I. Introduction
1. The general problem of economic predictions
The problem in writing this paper is that I am not a clairvoyant. I simply do not know what
the future of banking in general, and banking in Europe in particular, will be – and indeed,
nobody can rightly claim to know this. The future is uncertain, it unfolds as time goes by.
One important source of uncertainty is innovation, which is inherently unpredictable. But
apart from the nature and effects of innovations, one can identify certain general classes of
factors which will shape the future of banking (in Europe) and which at the same time give
cause for uncertainty with regard to this future. It is useful to distinguish between two
general sources of uncertainty: Firstly, external factors relevant to the development of
banking may change in ways that may be surprising. Secondly, banks and their managers
as well as their competitors, regulators, policy makers and the clients of banks act on the
basis of their expectations about the changing external factors, and each of them reacts to
the consequences which they expect others to draw from the changes which they anticipate.
The actions and reactions of the "players" in the banking world can be just as surprising as
the external factors.
These two classes of determinants of the future and causes of uncertainty with respect to
the future are not independent of each other. Economic agents hold beliefs about the future
and have strong economic incentives to take these expectations into account when they
determine how to act and to react, even though these beliefs may be quite vague. By acting
and reacting as rationally as possible, the economic agents jointly create the future which
they individually try to anticipate. Thus an economic prediction of the future (of banking in
Europe or any other comparable issue) can only be a speculation about possible paths of
development which are, however, constrained by the fact that agents act in anticipation of,
and in response to, external developments, the strategies chosen by other economic
agents, and their relevant beliefs.
The necessity of taking into account the interrelationships between the object of a prediction
and the expectations and actions of those who jointly shape this object is the essence of the
concept of a rational expectations equilibrium. In essence, economic evolution is an
uncertain equilibrium path over time. Thus simply extrapolating currently observable trends
would not be enough and might indeed lead to inappropriate conclusions.
19 Any attempt by
an economist to predict the future (of banking in Europe) should make use of this concept.
However, I should not take my inability to predict the future of banking in Europe too
seriously. As the concept of rational expectations suggests, I share this inability with those
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19 See Grossman (1981). It should be kept in mind that this concept of rational expectations neither has to
assume the unlimited rationality of all agents, nor does it abstract from uncertainty.22
who shape this future through their decisions and actions within banks and outside of banks.
It may therefore even be helpful to put myself in their shoes.
2. The focus of the paper
There are many questions which one might want to ask concerning the future of banking in
Europe. It would, of course, be impossible to address all of them here.
20 My choice of a
specific question to focus on is dictated by my current research interests. To me at least, the
most interesting question is whether the considerable differences between the financial and
banking systems of EU member countries will remain or whether banking in Europe will
converge – either to a position located somewhere between the present systems, or to a
system that is in effect modelled on the Anglo-Saxon system.
21 I therefore want to focus on
the future of the typical features of banking in much of continental Europe. These
peculiarities are, or at least have been until quite recently, the following:
(1)  Not strictly profit-oriented types of banks, such as savings banks and financial co-
operatives, play an important role.
(2)  Relationship banking is the dominant or at least the most characteristic model of
banking.
(3)  Universal banks are the prevailing type of banking organisations.
(4)  The main function of banks is to act as intermediaries between depositors or savers
and borrowers.
(5)  Financial systems are bank-dominated and not capital market-dominated.
(6)  Finally, there are considerable "structural" differences between the financial systems
of different countries in Europe.
Many competent observers in the academic world and in the banking and business
community seem to be convinced these days that financial and banking systems are likely to
change and also to become more similar in the near future – both worldwide and particularly
in European countries. Typically, they expect all financial systems to adapt to the Anglo-
Saxon model, which is capital market-dominated and in which banks still play a role, but one
that is different and much more limited than their traditional role in continental Europe.
22
More specifically, these observers do not see much of a future for traditional banking in the
sense of financial intermediation; for relationship banking as the dominant model of banking;
for non-profit banking or more specifically, banks which are not strictly profit oriented; for the
dominance of banks in the respective financial systems; and finally for important "structural"
differences between national financial and banking systems.  
3. The structure and methodology of the paper
The attempt to shed some light on the question whether these expectations can be
sustained, i.e., whether the six peculiarities of banking in Europe listed above are indeed
likely to disappear soon, or whether they are in fact more likely to remain, determines the
structure of this paper. Before embarking on an attempt to predict the future of banking in
(continental) Europe from the point of view and under the provisos outlined above, I take a
brief look at the past and the present – or rather the quite recent past – of the financial
systems of three major European economies in order to provide a basis for comparison. I
                                                       
20 For a different selection of aspects of the same general theme, see the book by Danthine et al. (1999).
21 Relevant recent work concerning this issue is summarised in Schmidt et al. (2001).
22  See Rajan/Zingales (1999) and, with a more moderate position, Danthine et al. (1999) and Danthine et al.
(2000) as important sources from the academic world. One source from the banking community, though
certainly a very significant and influential one, is Rolf-E. Breuer, the CEO of Deutsche Bank. Over the years,
Mr. Breuer has regularly made statements to the effect that a convergence to the Anglo-Saxon type of financial
system is to be expected. The most recent of these statements can be found in Deutsche Bank (2001). See also
the collection of interviews with chief operators within the banking industry in Engler/Essinger (2000). An
article by David Roche (2000) entitled "The 'Global' World is Anglo-Saxon" in the Wall Street Journal Europe
perfectly summarises this view and indicates how widespread it is. The opposing view that there will be a
convergence towards a position which incorporates "the best features" of the Anglo-Saxon and the German
financial systems can be found in OECD (1995, p. 119).23
will then discuss three sets of external or exogenous factors which most observers would
consider to be highly relevant to the future development of banking in Europe. These factors
are
(1) deregulation and liberalisation,
(2) dramatic advances in the field of information technology (IT), and
(3) the progressive economic and financial integration of Europe and the advent
       of the Euro.
23
One of the main problems with predicting the future of banking in Europe consists in
knowing how these exogenous factors can be linked to the "observable" specific
characteristics of (continental) European financial and banking systems, which may or may
not be likely to persist. As the opening paragraph tried to make clear, there seems to be only
one way of establishing a relationship between them. It consists of taking into account the
fact that the way in which the development of the external factors influences the observable
features of the European banking system, or systems, depends on the strategies chosen by
the economic agents, mainly the banks themselves. But bank strategies are not the only
"intermediary variable".
24 In addition to bank strategies, the intermediary variables also
include the nature of competition in the various segments of the market for financial and
banking services, and the structure of the banking industry in the individual countries and in
Europe as a whole. Thus bank strategies, competition and banking structures serve as con-
ceptual bridges linking external developments to an assessment of whether the main
characteristics of continental European banking systems are likely to disappear or to remain.
The approach taken in this paper is therefore to outline an informal microeconomic
framework or model, which is inspired by the concept of rational expectations, for the future
of continental European banking. Its structure is summarised in Figure 1. Besides being
informal and incomplete, this model has some additional weaknesses. Firstly, to a certain
extent the intermediary variables are themselves features of banking systems which are
partially observable. Secondly, they are not independent of one another. Furthermore, the
lists of external factors, of intermediary variables and of observable attributes are
                                                       
23 References to the relevant literature will be provided in section III.1 below.
24 The term "intermediary variable" may be unfamiliar to some readers. It corresponds to the term "intervening
variable" used in the psychological literature to designate unobservable elements (such as perception or








































































Figure 1: Structure of the Argument24
incomplete; and last but certainly not least, our knowledge of the links between the elements
is incomplete and highly speculative. Nevertheless, I hope that this framework will serve the
purpose of providing a conceptual structure for this paper and for answering the questions
addressed in it.
II. The Past and "Present" of Financial Systems in Europe
National banking systems are a part of national financial systems. They can only be under-
stood properly if one takes this "embeddedness" into account.
25 When we study the financial
systems of Germany, France and the United Kingdom (UK) as they were 15 to 20 years
ago, i.e. before the wave of deregulation and liberalisation of the mid 1980s, before the start
of European financial integration and before the revolutionary advances in IT of the past few
years, and then look again at these three financial systems as they presented themselves in
the recent past – say two years ago
26 – then the following picture emerges.
1. In the early 1980s, the German financial system was bank-dominated. Banks were very
important financial intermediaries, and intermediation was the main function of the banking
system. Corporate finance was mainly provided by banks. Banks also played a strong role in
the "insider-controlled" governance systems of the large non-financial firms. Close
relationships between banks and their customers – or in the case of firms, "housebank
relationships" – were a fact. Financial markets were relatively underdeveloped. Non-bank
financial intermediaries and capital markets were strongly influenced by the banks. The
German banking sector was fragmented into different subsectors, and the market share of
not strictly profit-oriented banks was high. The dominant, and certainly the most prominent,
type of banking organisation was the integrated universal bank. It would seem that, contrary
to the view conveyed in the popular and financial press, these fundamental characteristics of
the German financial and banking systems did not change until very recently.
27
2. The British financial system was the polar opposite. It was capital market-dominated.
Banks played a limited role in providing long-term financing to firms. The typical bank in the
UK was much more specialised than its German counterpart; bank-customer relations were
"at arm's length". Bank concentration was higher, and the degree to which the banks could
rightly be called universal banks was lower than in Germany. As far as corporate
governance systems are concerned, the UK had an "outsider-controlled" system, and the
banks had hardly any role in it. The development of capital markets was already at that time
more advanced; and non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) and capital markets were
much less dependent on banks than in Germany. The different roles of banks, NBFIs and
capital markets, in comparison to Germany, are reflected in different levels of intermediation
and different patterns of corporate finance. Again, when we look at the data referring to the
late 1990s, we can recognise the same structural features. Thus the British financial and
banking system has also not changed fundamentally.
28
3. The case of France is more difficult, as it does not offer such a clear picture. At the
beginning of the 1980s, state influence played a very prominent role in the French financial
system; banks dominated the financial sector; at least the large firms were "generously"
financed by banks which in turn were refinanced by central public institutions, notably "le
                                                       
25 The concept of "embeddedness" goes back to Granovetter (1985), a theoretical sociologist, and plays an
important role in many academic discussions of all kinds of social systems.
26 Limiting the considerations in this paper to the quite recent past – instead of "the present" – is motivated by
the concern that the developments of the last two years are too complex to permit an assessment at present. This
concern will be taken up again in the concluding section.
27 Surprising as it may seem, very little has been written in English on the German financial system. The best-
known source addressing the financial system as a whole is still Edwards/Fischer (1994). Many individual
elements of the German financial system are covered extensively in Obst/Hintner (2000). For the proposition
that the general character of the German financial system has not changed substantially in the past two decades,
see the reference in note 5 supra and the articles summarised there.
28 Among the best references concerning the British financial system are Buckle/Thompson (1998) and Bain
(1992).25
trésor". Banking regulation was pervasive and oppressive, and irrespective of their legal
status and ownership structure, banks were mainly instruments of government policy.
Financial markets were cloissonnés and unimportant for all but the government; access to
them was very restricted. All this changed dramatically in the following years. The banks
have lost their traditional burdens and privileges – and they have in the meantime suffered
greatly from the consequences of libéralisation, banalisation, marchéisation etc. If one looks
at purely quantitative measures, such as bank-related intermediation ratios and financing
patterns, it seems that France and its financial system have made a huge step from being
"more German than the Germans" – or from having a strongly bank-dominated system – to
being "more British than the British". However, in contrast to British banks, which seem to
know well what their specific strengths are and can exploit these strengths, it appears that
French banks have at least for a long time been searching in vain for an orientation and a
profitable strategy in their new environment.
29
The upshot of all of this is firstly that these three financial systems differed greatly at the
beginning of the 1980s, and they were still very different at the end of the 1990s. In fact, with
the possible exception of France,
30 there does not seem to have been much convergence
on a fundamental or structural level during this time span. This must come as a surprise, as
the convergence of regulation in Europe, advances in IT and financial integration following
the single market initiative have led many to expect that there would even be a
"fundamental" convergence of the three systems.
III. An attempt to predict the future of banking in Europe
As indicated in the introduction, I want to present a framework or an informal model of the
future of banking in continental Europe. Thus in much of what follows, I exclude the UK
banking system from the set of empirical references, because it clearly represents a
different type than those of continental Europe and one towards which others might develop.
1. External factors and their impact on bank strategies and competition
a) The development of the exogenous factors
The exogenous factors and developments (level A in figure 1) which will probably continue
to have an indirect influence on the observable peculiarities of banking in Europe (level C)
and a direct influence on the strategies pursued by banks, on the nature of the competition
in the market for banking services and on the structure of the banking industry (the
intermediary variables at level B) are: regulation, mainly deregulation and liberalisation, but
also reregulation; advances in IT; and economic, financial and monetary integration in
Europe.
Regulation: The dominant trend in the area of banking and financial regulation has been,
and will continue to be in the future, that of deregulation and liberalisation. In most European
countries banks are now allowed a much freer choice in the ways they conduct their
business (conduct deregulation), and they may now engage in lines of business which had
previously been barred to them. At the same time, others may now enter fields of economic
activity which had formerly been reserved for banks (structural deregulation). Thus in terms
of what they do, the distinction between banks and other financial service providers has
become blurred, and this process is likely to continue. The degree to which deregulation has
taken place in recent years differs greatly from country to country, which mainly reflects
different degrees of restrictive regulation at the beginning of this process after 1980.
31
But there is also a trend towards the introduction of other forms of regulation, notably capital
requirements, as a substitute for the outdated instruments, conduct and structural
                                                       
29 On the transformation of the French financial system in general see Bertero (1994), Faugère/Voisin (1994)
and Zerah (1993), and specifically on the changes in the banking system, Plihon (1999).
30 See Schmidt/Hackethal/Tyrell (2001) on the special case of France.
31 One of the best sources on the impact of deregulation on banking in various European countries is
Gual/Neven (1993); see also Gual (1999) and Engler/Essinger (2000)26
regulation. These requirements are currently under discussion, and it can be safely
predicted that they will change in the near future when the "new capital adequacy
framework" of the Basle Committee becomes effective; European banks will certainly be
affected by this development.
Information technology: The incredible advances in information technology and its
application in banking range from the computerisation of many back-office functions to
ATMs and most recently to electronic banking. One of the most important IT-related
developments is that it is now technically feasible to have computerised securities trading
systems with almost unlimited remote access, which is having a profound effect on the
efficiency, and thus the overall attractiveness, of organised capital markets. As a result,
capital markets will become deeper, more liquid and thus ultimately more attractive.
32 This
development has a historic parallel in the invention of the railroad, which reduced
transportation costs, increased the size of markets and completely changed the structure of
many industries.
33
Financial and monetary integration: Partially as an immediate consequence of the political
decision of 1986 to create a single market in Europe by the end of 1992, and partially as a
consequence of its implementation, the complete mobility of capital and people as well as
banking and many other financial services within the European Union became a reality in
the early 1990s. The general model of financial integration in Europe is that of the "single
passport". This concept combines minimum harmonisation, mutual recognition and home
country control for banks and other important groups of financial service providers. The
process of financial integration has gone a long way, but it is still not complete. By
eliminating the exchange rate risk within the Euro zone, the recent introduction of the Euro
as a common currency in most member countries of the EU has given this process an
additional push.
34
b) Their implications for bank strategies
The term "strategy" refers to the way in which a firm tries to establish and maintain
competitive advantage. It includes many aspects, such as the determination of markets or
fields of activity in which a given firm operates, its market entry and exit decisions, pricing,
product design and organisational design. Strategies are a reflection of external factors and
of the competitive situation in the industry under consideration. Competition is itself the
outcome of the strategies which the market participants choose and implement. Thus
strategies and competition determine each other mutually and are jointly determined by
external factors.
In what follows, I want to briefly sketch the likely implications of the aforementioned external
factors for the strategies of banks and their main competitors. A certain degree of overlap
and, moreover, interaction between the effects which the three external factors have on
bank competition is unavoidable. In the next subsection, the arguments pertaining to
competition are briefly summarised.
Effects of (de-)regulation on bank strategies
(a) Banks in many countries will broaden their range of products; at the same time, bank
products are now also available from non-bank financial intermediaries, and NBFIs will
probably play an even more extensive role as suppliers of these products in the future.
Therefore, banks will face stiffer competition, which will put
cost-containment
the entry into, and exit from, specific market segments,
and alliances, acquisitions and mergers
on the strategic agenda of all banks. Cost-containment appears possible in principle by
exploiting economies of scale through internal growth and external growth via acquisitions
                                                       
32 See Biais (1999) and Seiffert et al. (2000).
33 See Merton (1995), Mishkin/Strahan (1999) and again the interviews in Engler/Essinger (2000) on the impact
of IT on banking and finance.
34  As a selection from the literature on this issue, see ECB (1999), Danthine et al. (2000) and Walter/Smith
(2000).27
and mergers, and by reducing branch networks, which is often a motive for horizontal
mergers within countries. Market entry and exit strategies manifest themselves for instance
in the attempt to leave the field of retail banking, which is considered to be unprofitable in
some countries, and to enter specific areas in the broad field of investment banking.
(b) The traditional forms of bundling together different banking products, of following
integrated pricing strategies and cross-selling and cross-subsidising, which has been one of
the pillars of universal banking and also of relationship banking in the past, may become
less attractive or even no longer feasible as a consequence of the new forms of competition
from market entrants and the increasing intensity of competition.
(c) Strategies in the credit business are likely to change as a consequence of the new
capital adequacy regulation. This new regulation will benefit large borrowers with external
ratings, and big or network-affiliated lenders that possess sophisticated internal rating and
risk-management systems, or can more easily bear the cost of setting them up. It is likely
that some strictly profit-oriented banks, and particularly small profit-oriented banks, will
withdraw altogether from lending to small and medium-sized businesses and non-rated
firms. This opens up new opportunities for savings banks and co-operative banks, which are
typically affiliated to networks and can therefore share the set-up costs of rating and risk
management systems. Thus in the future banks will differ much more than during the past
two decades with respect to how much, in which forms and to whom they lend.
(d) Although deregulation and liberalisation make mergers and acquisitions easier within
countries and also across borders, strategies of external growth will differ greatly between
banks which focus on retail banking and those which are mainly involved in investment
banking.
All in all, de- and re-regulation offer opportunities to gain competitive advantage by adopting
differentiating strategies.
35 A one-size-fits-all approach, which seems to have dominated
bank strategies in past decades and whose adoption may have been inspired by certain
notions of "best practice", does not seem advisable for the future and will probably not
shape the emerging new banking scene in Europe.
(2) Effects of information technology on bank strategies
The overall effects of IT-related advances are twofold: IT reduces the costs of providing
banking services in general; and it changes the cost structure in such a way that fixed costs
increase while variable costs decline sharply. These effects apply to banks, to non-bank
financial intermediaries and to securities markets, though probably not with equal force.
Banks should take these effects into account in their strategies; and the greater flexibility
they now have as a consequence of recent deregulation makes it more likely that these
effects will indeed be incorporated into banks’ strategies in the future.
(a) The most dramatic effects of IT are probably on the internal processes and structures of
banks. An obvious example is the opportunity to reduce costs by installing ATMs and by
concentrating and relocating back-office functions. IT also changes the balance between the
centralisation and the decentralisation of decision-making authority. Decentralised decision
making combined with centralised monitoring and performance measurement has become
much easier in recent years; and the full implications of this trend are yet to be seen. Banks
which make full use of the potential to reduce costs and to increase flexibility are more
competitive. As this applies to all or most banks, there will be more competition, to which
banks will have to react by lowering their costs. This can be done by reducing staff and
increasing flexibility via decentralising the organisations and trimming administrative
hierarchies.
                                                       
35 This is one of the core strategies in the classification system devised by Michael Porter (1980); specifically
for the field of banking, see Smith/Walter (1997), Chapter 14, and Canals (1993).28
(b) Although econometric research suggests that economies of scale or the benefits of
sheer size are limited in banking in general and commercial banking in particular,
36 one can
nevertheless expect that IT-related developments increase the minimum efficient firm size in
the banking industry and therefore encourage mergers in retail banking. Most of all,
domestic mergers and acquisitions appear to be a way of reducing superfluous retail
capacity. In spite of the failure of the recent attempted mergers between BNP and Societé
Générale in France and between Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank and Dresdner Bank
and Commerzbank in Germany, there are numerous examples of large bank mergers which
have been successfully completed recently. Almost all of these have taken place within
national borders, while cross border mergers of commercial banks are extremely rare.
37 This
suggests that their main motive may indeed have been to cut costs. The potential for closing
costly branches would be limited in the case of a merger between Deutsche Bank and
Societé Générale.
(c) IT is changing the balance between banks, NBFIs and capital markets, i.e. banks have
tended to lose ground to their competitors. Especially as far as lending to big corporations is
concerned, capital markets have for quite some time been cutting into the traditional
business of banks. At least for certain types of borrowers, disintermediation seems to be a
reality.
38 Many banks are in fact reacting to this presumed trend by shifting their focus to fee-
earning and investment-related services. Germany's biggest bank, Deutsche Bank, provides
a good example of this strategy. The advances which NBFIs have made during the last
decade in the area of savings mobilisation, which represent a second type of
disintermediation, are also largely due to the fact that in the era of the Internet branch
networks become less important for providing financial services than they used to be.
(d) Given that IT seems to benefit capital markets at the expense of financial intermediation,
banks can react strategically by giving up territory they cannot defend anyway, such as
lending to multinationals, or by withdrawing from retail banking, or by becoming allies and
handsomely rewarded servants of the winning competitor, i.e. the capital market, providing
capital market-related services. But there are still fields of activity in which banks retain a
competitive and genuinely strategic advantage. These are quite traditional banking functions
such as providing liquidity insurance, lending in difficult-to-monitor cases and providing all-
round advice and services. For offering these services and for serving the clients who need
them and are willing to pay for them, especially small and medium-sized firms, the traditional
approach of relationship banking – possibly also provided in the traditional organisational
form of a universal bank – seems very well suited.
39 Banks should, and successful banks
will, be able to benefit from this strength. Furthermore, better communications technology
makes it easier for banks to provide this comprehensive set of services to far-away clients.
Thus it appears inappropriate to predict that the advent of IT leads to a complete "breaking
up (of) the bank"
40 or, more precisely, of the value chains whose combination under one roof
has been the hallmark of the traditional bank.
                                                       
36 For a summary of this line of research, see Berger (2000), and specifically for Europe Molyneux et al. (1996)
and Berger et al. (2000).
37 In a recent study, the ECB (2000) reports that out of the 2,153 M&As in the banking industry in Europe
between 1995 and the middle of 2000, only 16% had at least one aspect of a cross-border transaction; the rest
were purely internal mergers and acquisitions.
38 While this applies to certain groups of former bank borrowers, notably large corporations, empirical
arguments provided in Schmidt et al. (1999) cast doubt on the widespread assumption that disintermediation is
a general trend. On this, see also Hackethal (2000 and 2001) and Hackethal/Schmidt (2000b).
39 Empirical evidence concerning the persistence of relationship banking in Germany is provided in
Elsas/Krahnen (1998). See also Elsas/Krahnen (2000).
40 This is the title of a book by Lowell Bryan, a consultant with McKinsey, published in 1988. Similar
assessments are also found in the more academically oriented literature; see e.g. Miller (1998).29
(3) Effects of economic, financial and monetary integration on bank strategies
Among managers of large banks and some of their professional advisers, there seems to be
a widespread conviction that – in addition to the general trend towards globalisation – the
"single market programme", and much more so the introduction of the Euro, have indeed
already led, or will soon lead, to the emergence of one single market, in which rivalry
between existing banks is so fierce that only the strongest competitors can survive. As
strength is often assumed to come mainly from size, all one has to do in order to survive is
to consolidate either actively or passively, that is, to acquire or to be acquired or to merge.
At least in its generality, this prediction is not warranted. There is a need to differentiate
between commercial and retail banking on the one side, and investment and wholesale
banking on the other. The strategic implications of financial and monetary integration are
different for these different lines of business. The fact that in continental Europe these
different markets have typically not been served by different groups of banks makes it
difficult to draw practical conclusions from this general insight.
41
(a) We do not see much evidence of foreign banks' entering the retail markets of other
countries through geographical expansion or cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Retail
banking, which makes up the larger part of commercial banking, is a local and at best
regional industry, and it is likely to remain so in spite of the Euro. Economies of scale are
probably not easy to achieve in this industry, and if they are achievable, then mainly through
cost reduction by eliminating branches, which is only feasible within countries. Thus cross-
border consolidation is not a source of increased competition in retail commercial banking.
(b) However, increased competition for commercial banks results from the benefits which
financial and monetary integration in Europe offers for capital markets. This is a strategic
threat to commercial banks, or to the commercial banking divisions of universal banks, as
corporations are now in a better position to fund themselves through capital markets. The
corporate bond market in Europe has seen a virtual explosion since the introduction of the
Euro. Stock market activity has also increased considerably. The growing importance of
securities markets may reduce the demand for bank loans by – a less narrowly defined
group of – large corporations, and certainly makes a strategic shift of banks towards
investment and wholesale banking attractive.
42
(c) An additional push in this direction comes from the fact that European integration
stimulates mergers of non-financial firms. Banks will try to benefit from this business
opportunity. Investment banking is to be a pan-European and in many segments even a
global industry in which only "big players" can compete successfully. Some of these are
American investment banks. Attempts to match their size and prowess will lead to additional
mergers and acquisitions among European banks with a strong investment banking
orientation and even the emergence of a "league" of big European investment-oriented
banks. This trend is likely to find some support from national governments who want their
"national champions" to be part of this "champions' league".
(d) The increasing importance of investment and wholesale banking poses a strategic
challenge to most banks in Europe. In the past, most banks were essentially commercial
banks. Now this situation is changing. At least in some banks, investment banking can no
longer be treated as a useful addition to the main business, i.e. commercial banking. These
banks face the difficulty that commercial (and retail) banking on the one side, and
investment (and wholesale) banking on the other side require vastly different organisational
designs. For instance, optimal pay structures and career paths are different for these two
types of banks. Thus European integration challenges, indirectly at least, the conventional
                                                       
41 One of the most competent sources on the effect of the single market and the advent of the Euro on the
banking system, or banking systems, in Europe is Walter/Smith (2000). See also Danthine et al. (1999).
42  For new empirical data, which support this assessment, see ECB (2001).30
concept of a universal bank.
43 Banks will have to decide to what extent they want to be
"real" investment banks and how they adjust the rest of their business to accommodate this
decision. As a consequence we are likely to see more specialisation of European banks in
the future.
(e) The deepening of European stock markets, to a large extent caused by financial
integration in Europe, also leads to growing pressure on privately owned and publicly held
banks to create value for their shareholders and to improve their financial performance. One
can speculate that the pressure to create shareholder value might prevent some banks from
undertaking mergers and acquisitions which would mainly increase the prestige and power
of the top management of the respective banks.
(f) Financial integration should make cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the banking
industry easier in principle, and there are at least certain advantages to a strategy which
entails elements of a pan-European expansion. Nevertheless, cross-border M&A activity in
Europe has been very limited in recent years. One reason for this seems to be that the
banking industry is shaped by national cultures and national idiosyncrasies. It seems highly
unlikely that a "merger of equals" between two big banks from different European countries
would "work". The same can be expected for straight takeovers. Alliances and other forms
of co-operation might be more acceptable to the people who create value in the banks.
However, their success is strongly dependent on the partners' willingness and lasting ability
to respect each others' interests. Given the pressures under which they find themselves
now, big privately owned and publicly traded banks and their top managers may not find that
easy, and are therefore not likely to restrict their desire to dominate their foreign partners.
44
In this respect, not strictly profit-oriented banks might be in a better position; they may
appear to be, and indeed may really be, more reliable partners in pan-European alliances.
In summing up, one can say that the effects of financial and monetary integration are
different for mainly retail-oriented commercial banks than for more wholesale-oriented banks
or for primarily investment banks. We are not likely to see a fully integrated European
banking market except in wholesale and investment banking.
45
c) Implications for competition
In the last subsection, three external factors were discussed at some length in an attempt to
describe their isolated impact on the strategies of banks. Obviously, though, the three
exogenous, or external, factors are interdependent in their influence on bank strategies.
Therefore, a logical next step would be to analyse how these factors interact in shaping
bank strategies. At the moment there does not seem to be enough theoretical and empirical
research evidence to permit more than the "informed guess" that the three factors tend to
reinforce each other in terms of what they imply for bank strategies.
One implication of the three external factors and their interaction is that we can expect
competition in banking to intensify in the near future as a general tendency.
46 Competition
between existing competitors is likely to become stronger, mainly because of the effects of
IT on the cost structures of banks. The efforts of banks to spread their higher fixed costs
over a larger volume of business will induce them to compete for market shares, and this
typically leads to a general pressure on bank profitability. Non-banks and near-banks and
organised capital markets are likely to enter markets which were formerly reserved for banks
of a given country. Market entry of various types of new competitors from other countries
has now become at least a realistic possibility.
The strategic implications of this for an individual bank are very specific to the situation of
the bank. All one can say on a general level is that each bank must react to the increasing
                                                       
43 In early 2001 the "big three" traditional German Grossbanken adjusted their general organisational structures.
A divisional structure has now replaced the older client-oriented structures. This tends to make German banks
more similar to British banks which have for a long time been organised along similar lines.
44 The implicit allusion to the Daimler-Chrysler case is not accidental, see Der Spiegel, 26.2.2001, pp. 96-109.
45 This is also the view expressed and supported at great length in Walter/Smith (2000).
46 See also Remsperger (2000) who identifies the EMU as the single most important factor and refers to the
1999 all-time low of the interest margins of German banks at 1.28% as strong empirical support.31
competitive pressure by selecting very carefully the fields of activity it wants to focus on in
the future, and then by adapting all of its internal processes and structures to the
requirements of the market segment or segments in which it wants to compete. These
segments can be defined by type of service provided, by type of client, and by geographic
scope. Given that, obviously, not all banks will select similar strategies, we are likely to see
more specialisation of banks in the future. Some will become mainly investment banks,
some will remain mainly commercial banks; some will have a local or regional focus, while
others will have a broader geographic outreach. Clearly, the strategic selection of product
focus, client focus and geographical scope has to take into account that some combinations
are less attractive than others. It would be nice to be able to make general statements
concerning the nature of competition in the commercial banking and the investment banking
segments. But this is not possible; in order to make such statements, the broad categories
of commercial and investment banking would have to be broken down into much smaller
segments.
There is a counterforce to the trend of increasing competitive pressure. The strategic
reaction of individual banks to increased competition can take one of two forms. Either they
can try to gain a competitive advantage by growth, including mergers and acquisitions, in
order to exploit economies of scale; or alternatively they can specialise in certain market
segments. Given that economies of scale are difficult to achieve and that cross-border
mergers and acquisitions may be very difficult to negotiate, and even more difficult to
implement successfully, the specialisation alternative would seem to have a lot in its favour.
If many banks decide to specialise more in the future, this will reduce the number of
competitors in most market segments; and to the extent that competitive pressure is a
function of the number of market participants, the widespread adoption of strategies
emphasising specialisation could counter the competition-increasing forces listed above.
However, in banking the relationship between the number of competitors and the intensity of
competition is ambiguous. It is therefore impossible to state with precision whether the
intensity of competition will generally increase in the future. Nevertheless, as a general
tendency this appears highly likely.
Even though I have not been able to provide a detailed analysis of competition in the various
parts of the market for banking services, it seems to me that the above consideration of
bank strategies is not inconsistent with the sketch I have offered in this subsection: the
strategic implications of the external factors do not need to be completely rewritten when
one takes into account that the banks' strategies must also be a function of the prevailing
and expected competitive situation, which is itself an outgrowth of the strategies adopted by
the banks.
2. The development of banking structure(s) in Europe
There will be a process of consolidation in European banking. The number of banks will go
down. Some banks will be unable to adapt and therefore will simply disappear, be bought up
or merge. Whether this also implies a higher level of concentration depends on the specific
market segment and the extent of new market entry into this segment.
a) The future of different segments of the banking market
(1) Commercial and retail banking: It seems safe to expect that, mainly as a consequence of
IT and of the declining importance of traditional lending to corporations, concentration in
national retail markets will go up. But it is unclear how far this process of consolidation and
concentration will go. National peculiarities are strong in this area. It is hard to measure and
to compare concentration levels between countries because of the different roles of the
network-affiliated savings and co-operative banks in different countries. Not least because of
these networks, which are traditionally important in Europe, the patterns of consolidation
and concentration will differ greatly between countries. As explained above, large privately
owned listed banks with a clear international focus might decide to leave the retail market.
The example of Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank supports this proposition. But big British
banks are moving in precisely the opposite direction. Smaller privately owned banks can be32
expected to reduce their lending activity or even to give it up completely. Many of them have
already taken this step.
As market entry by foreign banks is relatively unlikely in the retail market, the commercial
and retail banking markets of the individual countries will in the future still be relatively
closed to foreign market entrants and more concentrated than in the past. They will be
dominated by a small group of banks or bank networks. Even though banks which are not
strictly profit-oriented may be successful in building up transnational pan-European
networks, the European market for retail banking will remain a patchwork of national
markets.
(2) Investment banking: In several subcategories of investment banking, international focus
and size are important, because size helps to attract high-calibre staff and to establish and
use reputation. Both of these arguments also suggest that it is attractive for an investment
banking firm to cover several areas in which valuable human capital and reputational capital
can be used. As far as the relationship with customers is concerned, national borders are
relatively unimportant for most parts of the investment banking business. We will therefore
see an increasing trend towards concentration and consolidation in the investment banking
industry on a European level. For reasons which are internal to the banking organisations it
appears plausible that the European banks that will succeed in this market will still retain a
distinct national identity. As the number of truly big banks in Europe (with a national flavour)
is probably not great we might see the market dominated by one or two big financial
institutions from each country. However some highly specialised small "boutiques" with a
good reputation will be able to defend their positions.
b) The future of different types of banks
(1) Big banks: One of the interesting questions about a new banking structure is which role
the really big national banks will play in the future. Today, most of them are national
universal banks providing a large array of services to many groups of clients. In the past,
some of them seem to have envisaged playing a similar role in several countries, that is,
becoming truly European universal banks. But this now seems to be neither achievable nor
attractive.
47 The costs of internal growth would simply be too high even for the largest
banks; external growth seems very difficult because national banking cultures differ too
much, and the benefits of being present in all market segments do not seem sufficiently
great. So what we can expect to see is a number of big national banks remaining universal
banks in their home countries but at the same time pursuing selective strategies in other
countries, such as concentrating on specific businesses or specific types of client. Their
number will probably decrease further as a consequence of domestic mergers.
(2) Not strictly profit-oriented banks: Co-operative and savings banks have in the past
played an important role in many European banking systems. It is therefore natural to ask
whether they will be able to maintain their positions in a future European banking system.
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The prospects appear good for various reasons. One is that at least in some countries the
big privately owned commercial banks are retreating from the domain in which the co-
operative and savings banks have their strongest position, namely the local and regional
retail market. The business clients of co-operative and savings banks are not likely to
migrate to the capital markets. The networks to which these banks belong provide a balance
of scale and flexibility and enable them to defend their traditional turf without having to forgo
the opportunities which deregulation, IT and financial integration might offer them. They
might even be particularly well placed to benefit from the option of financial integration. As
was explained above, their tradition of being part of networks or federations and the limited
performance pressure to which they are exposed because of their specific ownership and
governance structures may make them more trustworthy partners in pan-European alliances
than big, acquisition-hungry, strictly profit-oriented banks. However, whether the co-
operative and savings banks can exploit this potential is open to question because of their
unclear and, at least in the view of some observers, deficient ownership and governance
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systems. Moreover there is at least a possibility that the European Commission will break up
the governmental support and ownership of these institutions. It is too early to say what this
would imply for the savings banks; the answer will largely depend on the strategies chosen
by the big banks. If they withdraw from the retail market, as some big German banks seem
to be contemplating, then the prospects for semi-privatised savings banks could remain
good.
IV. Is banking in Europe likely to retain its specific features in the future?
In the introduction, six features were listed which are at least to a certain extent specific to
the banking and financial systems of continental Europe. As was said there, many
competent observers claim that in the process of modernisation and integration, these
features might be lost and that, moreover, the banking and financial systems in continental
Europe are likely to converge to the Anglo-Saxon type of financial and banking system.
The question which this paper addresses is whether these expectations are correct. In this
final section, an answer is sketched. The results of the preceding analysis will prove useful
for this undertaking, but they are certainly not sufficient on their own, and additional
considerations must be taken into account. It should also be remembered that history plays
an important role in shaping economic phenomena such as banking systems.
(1) The important role played by not strictly profit-oriented types of banks
Savings banks and co-operative banks have played, and to this day continue to play an
important role in the banking systems of many European countries, and they clearly differ
from other banks. The analysis shows that, for various reasons, co-operative and savings
banks are not likely to be eliminated by market pressures. Their specific feature of not being
strictly profit-oriented even has some advantages in the new environment. They may benefit
from the retreat of other banks from the retail banking segment; and they could generate
successful pan-European alliances in the future. This assessment can be supported by
empirical evidence which shows that these banks have survived the recent turmoil in the
financial markets better than many private banks. And indeed, there are theoretical
considerations which would have led to predictions that this would be the case.
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(2) Relationship banking as the dominant mode of banking
Relationship banking will remain an important feature of banking in Europe. But it is
questionable whether it will remain the dominant model for all companies. Big and even not-
so-big corporations have begun to use capital markets to a much larger extent than they
used to, and many banks have shifted to investment banking. In this context, the scope for
relationship banking is limited. Relationship banking will remain important or even increase
in importance for small and medium-sized firms and thus also for the savings and co-
operative banks which will specialise, to an even greater extent than they have in the past,
in serving these clients if, or because, private banks turn away from them.
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(3) Universal banks as the prevailing type of banking organisations
In the past, the term universal bank was used in a broad sense to designate a bank which
provides all kinds of banking services to all kinds of clients. Universal banks in this sense
may continue to exist, but they are certainly no longer the prevailing form of banks even
within national banking systems. The need to specialise is so great that banks will not want
to remain universal banks in this broad sense. A fortiori, we will not have universal banks of
this type covering several European countries. However, one can also speak of universal
banks in the sense of banks which provide many services to specific groups of clients.
Universal banks in this narrower sense are here to stay and may even gain in importance in
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catering for specific, but economically significance, groups of clients such as small and
medium-sized firms. They are the appropriate organisational form for relationship banking.
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(4) The important role played by traditional banking and bank-based financial intermediation
Financial intermediation, i.e. the combination of deposit mobilisation and lending, was once
the essence of banking. The decline of financial intermediation in general, and of
intermediation by banks in particular, has been predicted for quite some time. Recent
empirical research indicates that this prediction was wrong at least until the late 1990s and
as far as it was applied to the entire financial system of a country.
52 Bank intermediation
ratios have remained stable in many large industrial countries, notably Germany and the
UK. However, this might well have changed recently. The growth of securities market
activity in the years 1999 and 2000 points in this direction; and some banks, in particular
some big private banks, are eager to react to this situation by curtailing their involvement in
traditional banking operations. But I do not expect this to be a general tendency.
(5) The dominance of banks, as opposed to capital markets, in the respective national
financial systems
The importance of banks relative to capital markets will decline in the future. However, this
does not imply that the financial systems in continental European countries will soon change
their general character and become capital market-dominated. Whether a financial system
can be considered bank-dominated or capital market-dominated depends on many more
aspects than merely the level of capital market activity. I do not have the space to describe
the other aspects here, but if I did, my description would not support the proposition that the
financial systems of continental Europe are on their way to becoming capital market-
dominated. In spite of all the changes, banks seem able to maintain their strategic position
in a financial system if this position has traditionally been strong. Bank dominance might
however disappear in countries like France, in which the formerly strong, or even dominant,
role of banks was mainly a consequence of regulation and government policy.
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(6) Considerable differences between the financial systems of different countries
Even though the banking system in Europe will remain fragmented along national lines to a
certain extent, banking markets and even capital markets are in the process of becoming
more and more integrated. However, this alone will not eliminate the profound or "structural"
differences which still exist between some financial systems in Europe. A financial system is
a configuration of several elements which complement each other. This feature makes
coherent financial systems resistant to "structural" change and thus also to forces which
could be assumed to lead to a gradual convergence. Increasing similarity with respect to
one or a few elements is not sufficient to change the fundamental structure of a given
financial system and therefore does not lead to a convergence of entire financial systems.
However, it is an open question whether the recent and the foreseeable developments –
mainly in 1999 and 2000, the era of the stock market rally and the wave of new issues in
many European countries including Germany – are important enough to undermine the
coherence of the individual financial systems in Europe and thereby destabilise them, and
whether they will converge after having been "sufficiently destabilised".
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